Ken Friedman
2005-11-09 03:46:16 UTC
Dear Kjetil,
Your note caught my eye. Without responding to the full thread, I do
want to address the specific issue you raise, the issue of agency.
(As you suspect, this issue has been discussed on this list and in
related lists.)
Non-human actors in actor networks are not agents and they do not
possess agency. Bruno Latour describes actor networks, and he
describes non-human actors. He does not describe non-human agents.
There is an important difference.
An agent is "a person who acts. In philosophical usage it is not
implied that the action is on someone else's behalf" (Mautner 1996:
7). This second sentence covers an important qualification: an agent
in this sense is a person who acts on his or her own behalf, rather
than as the instrument of another's will. Agency is the property of
an agent.
An agent may be an "actant" (Akrich and Latour 1992: 259), but not
all actants are agents.
An agent is endowed with will and understanding. The quality of
agency involves will, and agent causation means both the power to act
(and to cause) AND the power NOT to act or to cause. This is also
connected to the quality of will. (See, f.ex., Rowe 1995: 13).
Artifacts lack this power.
Artifacts are the instruments of their creators. They do not
understand what they are doing in the sense of conscious
comprehension of their role in the actor networks of which they are
part. They lack the will or freedom NOT to act or cause.
Latour writes in a provocative and entertaining way that seems to
blur the notion of agency into the notion that you describe using the
term "actant." Nevertheless, not even Latour seems to claim that
"actants" are agents possessing agency in the sense that agents
possess will and understanding. In defining the notion of an actant,
Latour and Akrich (1992: 259) shade the case by describing an actor
as an "actant endowed with a character (usually anthropomorphic)."
They use the term "endowed" in an ambiguous way: it suggests without
explicitly describing an attribute the actant possesses in its own
right OR it designate an attribute bestowed by the will of another.
The term anthropomorphic, on the other hand, clearly indicates
something that RESEMBLES a human being without being one.
Attributing agency to artifacts may be useful as a thought experiment
or a metaphor. The sign, "the groom is on strike!" (Latour 1992: 227)
does not describe the purposeful behavior of an agent. It recasts the
malfunctioning of an artifact in comical metaphoric terms by
comparing a malfunctioning artifact to a human being taking
purposeful action. No artifact that exists today acts with willful,
conscious purpose. Artifacts are the instruments of their human
creators.
Manufactured artifacts cannot possess agency unless we redefine the
term "agency" to exclude precisely the qualities of will and
understanding that define agency as we now use the term.
Yours,
Ken
References
Akrich, Madeleine and Bruno Latour. 1992. "A Summary of a Convenient
Vocabulary for the Semiotics of Human and Nonhuman Assemblies."
Shaping Technology / Building Society. Studies in Sociotechnical
Change. Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, Eds. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
MIT Press, 259-264.
Latour, Bruno. 1992. "Where are the Missing Masses. The Sociology of
a Few Mundane Artifacts." Shaping Technology / Building Society.
Studies in Sociotechnical Change. Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, Eds.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 225-258.
Rowe, William L. 1995. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Robert
Audi, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mautner, Thomas. 1996. A Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kjetil Fallan wrote:
"Please excuse me if this should be old news to the list, but since
no-one else has made mention of it hitherto in this thread, I thought
I'd offer a non-designer point of view:
"Nonhuman agency has been discussed in the field of Science,
Technology and Society studies (STS) since the late 1980s. The
seminal text in this respect is
"Bruno Latour (under the pseudonym Jim Johnson), Mixing Humans and
Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closerin Social Problems
Vol. 35, No. 3, June 1988, p 298-310
Latour here demonstrates how nonhuman entities become actants through
their design: certain tasks have been delegated to them, and
performing these tasks (or not performing them, or performing them
badly) make the nonhumans actants inhabit the given actor network on
a par with human actants. To stick with Latour's case: this line of
thought is what makes the sign put up on a door, informing about a
dysfunctional door-closer, far more appropriate than the author (of
the sign, not the article) might have intended: 'THE GROOM IS ON
STRIKE!'
"Thinking of nonhumans as actants on a par with human actants poses
challenges to many forms of design studies, but I find it a fresh and
rewarding perspective to keep in mind when analyzing design
processes, products and their meanings in the writing of a cultural
history of design. Historians tend to get seduced by the agency of
('great') human actors, loosing sight of the other inhabitants of the
actor network. This is where Latour's insistence on the agency of
nonhumans can function as a corrective."
--
Ken Friedman
Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
Institute for Communication, Culture, and Language
Norwegian School of Management
Design Research Center
Denmark's Design School
email: ***@bi.no
Your note caught my eye. Without responding to the full thread, I do
want to address the specific issue you raise, the issue of agency.
(As you suspect, this issue has been discussed on this list and in
related lists.)
Non-human actors in actor networks are not agents and they do not
possess agency. Bruno Latour describes actor networks, and he
describes non-human actors. He does not describe non-human agents.
There is an important difference.
An agent is "a person who acts. In philosophical usage it is not
implied that the action is on someone else's behalf" (Mautner 1996:
7). This second sentence covers an important qualification: an agent
in this sense is a person who acts on his or her own behalf, rather
than as the instrument of another's will. Agency is the property of
an agent.
An agent may be an "actant" (Akrich and Latour 1992: 259), but not
all actants are agents.
An agent is endowed with will and understanding. The quality of
agency involves will, and agent causation means both the power to act
(and to cause) AND the power NOT to act or to cause. This is also
connected to the quality of will. (See, f.ex., Rowe 1995: 13).
Artifacts lack this power.
Artifacts are the instruments of their creators. They do not
understand what they are doing in the sense of conscious
comprehension of their role in the actor networks of which they are
part. They lack the will or freedom NOT to act or cause.
Latour writes in a provocative and entertaining way that seems to
blur the notion of agency into the notion that you describe using the
term "actant." Nevertheless, not even Latour seems to claim that
"actants" are agents possessing agency in the sense that agents
possess will and understanding. In defining the notion of an actant,
Latour and Akrich (1992: 259) shade the case by describing an actor
as an "actant endowed with a character (usually anthropomorphic)."
They use the term "endowed" in an ambiguous way: it suggests without
explicitly describing an attribute the actant possesses in its own
right OR it designate an attribute bestowed by the will of another.
The term anthropomorphic, on the other hand, clearly indicates
something that RESEMBLES a human being without being one.
Attributing agency to artifacts may be useful as a thought experiment
or a metaphor. The sign, "the groom is on strike!" (Latour 1992: 227)
does not describe the purposeful behavior of an agent. It recasts the
malfunctioning of an artifact in comical metaphoric terms by
comparing a malfunctioning artifact to a human being taking
purposeful action. No artifact that exists today acts with willful,
conscious purpose. Artifacts are the instruments of their human
creators.
Manufactured artifacts cannot possess agency unless we redefine the
term "agency" to exclude precisely the qualities of will and
understanding that define agency as we now use the term.
Yours,
Ken
References
Akrich, Madeleine and Bruno Latour. 1992. "A Summary of a Convenient
Vocabulary for the Semiotics of Human and Nonhuman Assemblies."
Shaping Technology / Building Society. Studies in Sociotechnical
Change. Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, Eds. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
MIT Press, 259-264.
Latour, Bruno. 1992. "Where are the Missing Masses. The Sociology of
a Few Mundane Artifacts." Shaping Technology / Building Society.
Studies in Sociotechnical Change. Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, Eds.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 225-258.
Rowe, William L. 1995. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Robert
Audi, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mautner, Thomas. 1996. A Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kjetil Fallan wrote:
"Please excuse me if this should be old news to the list, but since
no-one else has made mention of it hitherto in this thread, I thought
I'd offer a non-designer point of view:
"Nonhuman agency has been discussed in the field of Science,
Technology and Society studies (STS) since the late 1980s. The
seminal text in this respect is
"Bruno Latour (under the pseudonym Jim Johnson), Mixing Humans and
Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closerin Social Problems
Vol. 35, No. 3, June 1988, p 298-310
Latour here demonstrates how nonhuman entities become actants through
their design: certain tasks have been delegated to them, and
performing these tasks (or not performing them, or performing them
badly) make the nonhumans actants inhabit the given actor network on
a par with human actants. To stick with Latour's case: this line of
thought is what makes the sign put up on a door, informing about a
dysfunctional door-closer, far more appropriate than the author (of
the sign, not the article) might have intended: 'THE GROOM IS ON
STRIKE!'
"Thinking of nonhumans as actants on a par with human actants poses
challenges to many forms of design studies, but I find it a fresh and
rewarding perspective to keep in mind when analyzing design
processes, products and their meanings in the writing of a cultural
history of design. Historians tend to get seduced by the agency of
('great') human actors, loosing sight of the other inhabitants of the
actor network. This is where Latour's insistence on the agency of
nonhumans can function as a corrective."
--
Ken Friedman
Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
Institute for Communication, Culture, and Language
Norwegian School of Management
Design Research Center
Denmark's Design School
email: ***@bi.no